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THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACT
ARGUMENT*
David Lyonst
As truth is the first virtue of belief, so justice is of social
institutions. That is John Rawls's view,' and it seems true, at any
rate, of the law. Official acts, laws, and legal arrangements generally are characterized as just or unjust, while other moral categories
are much less frequently invoked. Justice seems inseparable from
good law. It is therefore striking and important that justice has
recently been regarded by prominent legal theorists as rationally
disreputable-as, in Kelsen's words, "an irrational ideal."'2 Many
divergent conceptions of social justice have been propounded, and
it is held that there is no rational basis for selecting among them.
At the extreme, it is said that the principles of justice express basic
moral convictions which are merely conventional or subjective, a
matter of arbitrary commitment or irrational sentiment.
Such moral skepticism is not, of course, confined to legal
scholars, nor is it bounded by the law. It passes for conventional
wisdom in our time; it pervades the academies; it seems an essential element of tough-minded intellectual sophistication. One finds
it grasped tenaciously by students, including some who balance it
delicately, if unreflectively, with deep moral concerns about the
practice and uses of law. But the rational credentials of moral
skepticism are themselves uncertain, for cogent supporting arguments have always been elusive. The most one can say, perhaps, is
this: skepticism about moral judgments seems better grounded
than skepticism about, say, physical science. Moral knowledge still
seems an open question.
I wish to consider Rawls's theory of justice as opposed to moral
skepticism. This is not, of course, the only way it can be taken. It is
important if only because Rawls develops a conception of justice
* Presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,
Section on Jurisprudence, December 29, 1973.
I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Richard Miller of the Cornell University
Philosophy Department for his most helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this paper.
t Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University. A.B. 1960, Brooklyn College; M.A.,
Ph.D. 1963, Harvard University.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971).
2 H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 13 (A. Wedberg transl. 1945). See
also C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT (J. Petrie transl.
1963); A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1959).
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that can compete on equal terms with utilitarianism, which many
have found objectionabl, but which recently has had no serious
challengers. But it is also important, I believe, because Rawls offers
arguments for his principles, at least as opposed to such alternatives as utilitarianism. These arguments can thus be taken in two
ways. At the very least, Rawls claims to show the superiority of his
conception of justice to, say, utilitarianism; and, if this claim can
validly be made, then the principles of justice are not simply
arbitrary. Rawls might even be thought of as fully justifying basic
moral principles. If Rawls succeeds in the second way, then moral
skepticism is shown to be untenable. His theory merits our attention, then, not simply because it may accurately express our fundamental moral inclinations, but also because it may vindicate them
by defending corresponding principles.
Two arguments run side by side in Rawls's book. What I shall
call the "coherence argument" involves Rawls's claim that his principles of justice are more congruent with our most considered
moral judgments than are the alternatives, such as utilitarianism.
His principles are supposed to express our shared sense of justice
by according best with our impartial, intuitive, and most confident
3
moral judgments.
Arguments of this type have been used from Plato onward,
sometimes with negative effect. Indeed, Rawls's theory of justice
seems to have been motivated at least in part by his initial dissatisfaction with utilitarianism and its supposed conflicts with some of
our considered moral judgments. But coherence arguments have
also been used to give moral principles positive support.
A coherence argument is unlikely to be conclusive, even as an
explication of our shared sense of justice. It is unlikely that any
intuitively plausible and illuminating set of principles will mesh
neatly with a predetermined set of considered moral judgments.
To achieve a satisfactory fiLbetween judgments and principles, so
that the latter can seem to ground the former and to extend them
in an acceptable way, the principles must be modified, some judgments must be discounted, or both. As a consequence, and because
our considered moral judgments will cover a very limited range of
cases, alternative explications of our shared sense of justice are
quite possible. And the decision as to which explication among the
alternatives is the best must be made in the absence of clear rules
3 J. RAWIs, supra note 1, at 46-49.
4 Id. at viii.

0
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or guidelines. Thus, Rawls cannot and does not claim either that
his principles provide a perfect match with our most considered
moral judgments or that utilitarianism is ruled out conclusively.
Such complications aside, the justificatory force of a coherence
argument is unclear. Rawls regards our sense of justice as "a skill in
judging things to be just and unjust, and in supporting these
judgments by reasons." 5 A skeptic will of course deny that characterization. But even one who supposes that there are valid principles of justice might regard a coherence argument as explicating
our shared sense of justice, in the sense of giving concise expression to our basic moral convictions, without implying anything
about the validity of the resulting principles. A coherence argument
seems to move us in a circle, between our current attitudes and the
principles they manifest. To regard such an argument as justifying
moral principles seems to assume either a complacent moral conventionalism or else a mysterious "intuitionism" about basic moral
knowledge. It is a form of argument whose legitimacy has never
clearly been established.
It is natural here to compare principles in ethics with theories
in science, for the coherence argument, when viewed as a
justification of moral principles, looks like a method of
"verification" analogous to the testing of scientific theories.
-Theories in science can be used to generate statements that can be
tested by observations. Such observations are used to verify, or at
least to falsify, theories that imply them. And, unless one is a most
radical skeptic, one will agree that observation statements are either
true or false and thus that scientific theories can be counted as true
or false too. But what are the data in ethics against which principles
are to be tested, the data corresponding to observation statements?
Under the coherence argument, they are our most considered
moral judgments. Since these are impartial, intuitive, and most
confidently made, they can be assumed faithfully to express our
basic moral convictions. But skeptical doubts about the objectivity
of moral judgments apply to these considered judgmentsas well as
to general principles; one can wonder whether they express any
more than arbitrary commitments or sentiments we happen to
have. This is why the coherence argument seems to assume either
conventionalism or intuitionism: the data used to test moral principles consist of either the judgments we happen to share, or the
expression of intuitive insights. Skeptical doubts about the rational
5 id. at 46.

0
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tenability of ethics could hardly be dispelled by such coherence
arguments alone.
This suggests the importance of Rawls's second -line of argument, his main support for the principles of justice, the so-called
"contract argument." Under this argument, the principles of justice
are supposed to be what "free and rational persons concerned to
further their own interests would accept in an initial position of
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association."6
Within the contract argument, no appeal is made to considered
moral judgments. The parties to the contract reason solely on the
basis of self-interest. The argument is designed to yield determinate results in a rigorous manner. I shall discuss this notion in
stages, in order to emphasize the significance of some of its
features.
We are to imagine that a number of individuals who realize
that they can benefit from cooperation seek agreement on the
distributive ground rules for their social arrangements. If they can
all agree on one set of principles, then, Rawls claims, those princi7
ples are certified as the principles of justice.
What is the basis for Rawls's claim? What bearing can such an
imaginery agreement have on us? Why should we think ourselves
bound by it, obliged to judge our institutions by the principles that
are agreed to in such a manner, and to act accordingly? An obvious
difficulty is that any group of individuals is likely to be misinformed about, or at least ignorant of, some relevant facts, and may
not be very rational. How absurd to suppose ourselves bound by
principles that may be grounded in ignorance or bad reasoning!
Rawls avoids these objections by assuming that the deliberators
have full knowledge of all the relevant general facts and scientific
laws" and that they are also rational-at least in the sense that they
can make decisions on the basis of their long-term self-interest. 9
Even so, an arbitrarily selected group of individuals is unlikely
to agree, or may very well agree on some distributive ground rules
that specially favor some rather than others. Each person will seek
principles to serve himself best, given his own special talents,
interests, needs, and condition in society. To avoid this source of
contention, Rawls places the deliberators behind a "veil of ignorance" that deprives them temporarily of information about them6 id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.

at
at
at
at

11.
118-19.
137.
143.

1068

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1064

selves, their specific conditions, and their social circumstances.10
Then they cannot serve their separate, divergent interests, so they
must select principles on the basis of their general knowledge of
human beings and social institutions. They consider only the distribution of so-called "primary goods," things it is reasonable to
assume that anyone would want, such as income and wealth, power
and authority, liberty and self-esteem."
These features of Rawls's hypothesis simplify the argument
enormously, for they mean that the deliberators reason alike from
the same premises. An incidental effect is that this is a "contract
argument" in the most attenuated sense, since no room is left for
disagreement, bargaining, or even relevant differences among the
parties. At any rate, an important consequence is that the parties
cannot disagree in their selection of principles. Each reasons alike
from the same premises, so if the information made available
enables any one of them to rank alternative principles, it enables
2
them all to do so, and in that case unanimity is guaranteed.1
The problem of choice would still be extremely complex, so
Rawls simplifies it further, increasing the likelihood that it has a
rational solution. For example, instead of considering all questions
of social justice, the deliberators limit their attention to the basic
institutions of society; instead of choosing principles to suit all
possible circumstances, they initially assume that their society actually conforms to whatever principles they select and that everyone
3
there tries his best to serve justice.1
When all such qualifications are imposed, deliberation can
proceed. Rawls has the deliberators compare alternative principles.
He argues, first, that given the special conditions that have been
imposed, rational individuals who are choosing basic distributive
ground rules would adopt a "maximin" strategy, which aims at
maximizing the mininium outcome. The worst-off members of
society can fare better or worse, depending on the circumstances
and the social system. The best principle, according to the maximin
rule, is the one that does not allow the worst-off members of society
4
ever to fare as badly as they might fare under other principles.1
Given this connecting link, Rawls reasons that his principles would
be preferred to others, since they favor the least advantaged
Id. at 137.
I Id. at 62, 142.

10

12 Id. at 139-40.
13 Id.
14 Id.

at 8.
at 152-57.
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members of society. It would be agreed, he holds, that primary
goods "are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
. . . is to everyone's advantage,"' 5 and furthermore, that, when
conditions permit the effective establishment and exercise of extensive personal liberty, equal basic liberty should be maximized
and held inviolable. 16 The deliberators would choose such principles over, say, average utilitarianism, which might provide a higher
average standard of living but might also permit some persons to
benefit at others' expense, and would never hold liberty inviolable.
Let us now step back and ask what all this accomplishes.
Although Rawls provides only an elaborate sketch, he suggests that
a rigorous argument is possible.' 7 If that is right, then, from a
logical standpoint, the'contract argument is more powerffil than a
standard coherence argument. More important, the contract argument might also be thought to possess greater justifif atory force,
because it avoids the suspicious circularity of the coherence argument by grounding principles not on moral convictions that we
happen to have, but on the independent theory of (self-interested)
rational choice and facts about the human condition. Rawls, at any
rate, claims that this argument justifies his principles. 8
However, it is not obvious that the principles of justice are to
be viewed as the solution to a problem of (self-interested) rational
choice-or that, when they are so viewed, they have been certified
as moral principles. Rawls does not adequately explain this aspect of
his argument. And there are at least some possible grounds for
thinking that he may have missed the mark and brought forward
something other than a conception of justice.
That is, one can construe Rawls's principles as a rational
(self-interested) departure from an egalitarian norm, where equality, and not Rawls's explicit principles of distribution, serves as the
conception of justice per se. This interpretation is encouraged by
the fact that one can find in Rawls the suggestion of an argument
for egalitarianism, in addition to another argument, on rational
(self-interested) grounds, to depart from that norm. In the first
place, Rawls maintains that distributions flowing from or based on
natural or social contingencies alone are "arbitrary from a moral
point of view."1 9 Although he seems to believe there is a valid
15 Id. at 62.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.

at
at
at
at

152.
18.

21.
15, 72.
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distinction between just and unjust distributions, he seems at first
to deny that there is any valid moral basis for discriminating among
persons when conferring benefits and imposing burdens. This
points, at least on the surface, to a strict egalitarianism.2" But, in
the second place, Rawls also believes that devices such as incentives
can benefit all, 2 1 though they do so unequally. 22 When they do, it
seems rational to accept them and irrational, from a self-interested
point of view, to refuse them. Thus, it seems rational, in general,
from a self-interested point of view, to accept such departures
from strict egalitarianism. One cannot lose; one stands only to gain.
In this way, Rawls's position can seem like an amalgam of a moral
egalitarianism and a non-moral acceptance of beneficial inequalities.
The temptation so to view Rawls's principles is reinforced by
what I imagine would be our shared, considered moral judgment
of a test case: Suppose that a society has been organized on
egalitarian lines by a unanimous agreement, freely entered into.
Suppose, further, that its members realize they could improve their
material conditions by accepting Rawlsian inequalities, which
benefit everyone. But, despite this, they freely and unanimously
reaffirm their commitment to egalitarian institutions, thus refusing
possible benefits. Now, from a self-interested standpoint, they
might well be regarded as irrational. But there seems little reason
to call them, or their institutions, unjust, or in any way defective
from the standpoint of justice. 3 Since they would be defective
according to Rawls's principles, those principles seem miscast as
principles of justice, even if they can be supported by the special
argument from rational self-interest in the original position.
Rawls does not, of course, present his conception of justice as a
compromise between morality in the form of egalitarianism and
rational self-interest. His conception is supposed, rather, to embody the notion of "reciprocity, '24 which corresponds closely to the
notion of a "fair exchange." It seems a fair exchange, indeed, for
the less advantaged to allow others extra benefits when everyone
20 See id. at 100-01.

21 In other words, the worst-off members of the society with incentives will then be
better off than anyone in the egalitarian society.
22 Id. at 78.
23 Rawls's principles of justice require a departure from equality if that departure

would benefit everyone. See note 25 infra. But Rawls's special terminology seems to bow in
the direction of our contrary intuitions. Thus, egalitarianism under such conditions would
be called "just throughout, but not the best just arrangement." J. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 79.
24 Id. at 102-03.
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will benefit as a consequence, and for the more advantaged to
restrict their extra benefits to whatever will be useful to others. But
Rawls's principles go well beyond this intuitive notion of fairness,
since the intuitive notion merely allows such fair exchanges and
does not require them. Rawls's principles require them, in the name
of justice.2 5
These remarks are intended not as objections to Rawls's substantive principles, but as suggestions that his contract argument
lacks moral force. It must be granted, however, that I have only
given reasons for doubting that Rawls's principles fall neatly into
the traditional category of justice; even if this were true, it would
not follow that they do not describe the most important virtue of
social institutions, as Rawls claims they do. Furthermore, I believe
that much can be said in defense of Rawls's contract argument.
Let me deal first with a couple of unsatisfactory defenses of it.
Someone might concede that the contract argument does not
generate moral principles, but then assert that it is not supposed to.
The coherence argument identifies certain principles as expressing
our shared sense of justice, and the contract argument is supposed
only to confer on those principles independent rational force, not
moral certification. But, if nothing more were said, even that
rational force would be problematic, since none of us seems likely
to be found in circumstances resembling the original position.
Alternatively, it might be held that the contract argument has
moral force because of certain constraints imposed on it that I have
not yet, mentioned. For example, Rawls restricts the alternatives
that are to be considered by the hypothetical deliberators to what
he calls "recognizably ethical" conceptions.26 But this restriction
would not help the argument at all. Once again, it would not
explain how such principles are binding on us, or at least rational
for us, here and now. Indeed, from a self-interested point of view,
such restrictions would only serve to weaken the contract argument, for they would limit the choices of deliberators and might
exclude principles that would otherwise be favored. Finally, these
restrictions might account for the impression I have already de25 Unless Rawls's principles required such "reciprocity," thus guaranteeing that prospects
under them would be better than under egalitarianism, they might also compare unfavorably with utilitarianism and thus fail to be selected in the original position. This suggests
another basis for questioning Rawls's actual argument for his principles, which is not to be
confused with the general notion that principles are grounded only in a fair procedure, that
is, the notion of 'justice as fairness." For other doubts about the success of Rawls's actual
argument, see Lyons, Rawls Versus Utilitarianism, 69 J. PHILOSOPHY 535-45 (1972).
26 J. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 125; see id. at 130.
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scribed, that Rawls's principles are an amalgam of morality and
self-interest.
To develop a more satisfactory contract argument, one must
combine some suggestions made by Rawls that are either never
explicitly put together; sufficiently emphasized, or adequately developed. One such suggestion made by Rawls is that the principles
of justice can be regarded as emerging from a fair procedure.2 7
The original position is supposed to guarantee just that. But, to
understand the force of this claim, one must explore what Rawls
has to say about the notion of "pure procedural justice. '2 8 In
addition, one must take seriously
Rawls's idea that we can enter the
29
original position at any time.
"The idea of the original position," Rawls says, "is to set up a
fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. The aim
is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of
theory." 30 In the original position, no one enjoys an unfair advantage over another; no one is able, for example, to exploit his
knowledge of the facts in order to serve his own special interests at
others' cost. The veil of ignorance prevents that.3 1 When full
knowledge of general facts and sound reasoning ability are also
conferred on the deliberators, they all stand as equals. If they
freely concur, that agreement will be fair. But what they agree to is
how goods should be distributed in their society. Thus, a fair
procedure is used to determine just distributions. This, I take it, is
the root idea of 'justice as fairness. 3 2
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that a fair agreement is reached in the original position. Why should it follow that
the principles agreed to are adequate criteria of justice? Rawls's
answer involves his use of the notion of "pure procedural justice."
According to Rawls, "pure procedural justice obtains when there is
no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a
correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct
or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been
properly followed. This situation is illustrated by gambling." 3 3 We
might consider another example: Suppose that during an epidemic
medical supplies are scarce relative to need; they cannot usefully be
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31

at 12, 120, 136.
at 85-86.
at 138-39.
at 136.

Id.

32 Id. at 120.
33 Id. at 86.
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divided among all the persons who need them. We can think of
everyone in need as having an equal claim; or, if this violates the
conditions assumed for pure procedural justice, we can suppose
that no one has any claim to the supplies. In such circumstances, a
fair lottery might legitimately be used to decide who shall obtain
the medicine. Whatever the procedure chosen, if it is fair and
properly followed, then the outcome can be regarded as fair.
Rawls's idea must then be that his hypothetical deliberators cannot
invoke any independent criterion of just distribution. If they are to
have one, they must forge their own. They themselves must choose
among the possible bases for social organization.
But this seems to imply that there simply are no independent
criteria of social justice. 3 4 It is not that the veil of ignorance
deprives one of, or prevents one from discovering, moral knowledge, but rather that it forces one to create it.
It has not yet been shown how the contract argument could
have any bearing on us. We are not in the original position; we are
imperfect reasoners; we lack full general knowledge; and we know
at least some of our own special circumstances. Why should we
suppose that the principles some imaginary deliberators would
accept under circumstances very different from ours are the principles of justice that we should judge with, and act by, here and
now? Why should we suppose they have any rational force for us?
Rawls replies that we can enter the original position at any time. All
it takes is a willingness to deliberate about basic principles while
accepting certain" restrictions on our deliberations. The main restriction" that Rawls seems to mean is impartiality: we must not
allow ourselves to be swayed by considerations of special interest.
This mirrors the veil of ignorance and is, presumably, part of its
justification.
But that does not take us far enough. Suppose we can enter
34 By virtue of his use of the idea of pure procedural justice, Rawls seems committed to
denying that there could be any independent arguments for principles of social justice, for
any such arguments would amount, in effect, to independent criteria. Rawls does not
explicitly make such a claim, but it should be noted that he designs his contract argument to
ensure that its results will not conflict with those of the coherence argument. Id. at 19-21.
Because of this, as well as Rawls's unargued commitment to such values as fairness and
impartiality, it is possible to construe the contract argument as a special branch of the
coherence argument. In other words, the contract argument may be a way of working out
the implications of certain values that we happen to share. I have refrained from viewing the
contract argument in this way because, in view of the weakness of any mere coherence
argument, the result would be to compromise, to undermine the integrity and independence
of, the contract argument, and thus to strip it of any justificatory force that it otherwise
might have. But I am not sure that Rawls would agree with me here.
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the original position, so to speak, at any time. Why should we
bother to do so? Part of Rawls's answer must be that the notion of
pure procedural justice applies to us and not merely to the imaginary deliberators. Rawls seems to grant to moral skepticism the
most he could possibly grant-without giving up morality
entirely-by claiming that just distributions cannot be founded on
natural or social contingencies alone. According to Rawls, then, the
grain of truth in moral skepticism-which is not negligible-is that
we must make our own moral principles. We cannot look elsewhere
to discover'the proper basis for a just society. Skeptics conclude
that our principles must be arbitrary. But, in Rawls's view, this does
not follow. We can not only make our own principles, we can also
certify them ourselves. At least, we can rationally choose among the
alternatives. We can do this by using a fair procedure. Indeed, if
the skeptic's main point is granted, we cannot discover valid moral
principles, for we must make whatever moral principles we are to
have. But the fact that there exist no valid moral principles independent of fair procedures for selecting them is precisely what
entitles us to invoke the idea of pure procedural justice and to rely
entirely on a fair procedure. On this view, justice will conform to
the outcomes of fair procedures; nothing else, at this most elementary level where basic principles are at stake, can be its source.
Arguments about basic principles that conform to the constraints
placed on deliberation in the original position are, then, a fair basis
for justice.
It is an exaggeration, however, for Rawls to say that we can
enter the original position as he describes it. He suggests that we
can do so if we have the will, and to some extent this may be
possible. We can, perhaps, constrain ourselves to reason and deliberate impartially. But we cannot reproduce at will other central
features of the original position. Even with the best will in the
world we cannot simply confer on ourselves either full rationality
or full knowledge of all the general facts, of the laws of human
nature and of social institutions, and of whatever else is relevant.
Nevertheless, I do not regard this as a defect in the contract
argument idea. We can always be mistaken, and an account of
anything aspiring to be moral knowledge which did not acknowledge this would be much less plausible. We should think of the
hypothetical contract argument as an ideal that we can only approximate in practice. The outcomes of our best efforts at deliberations about basic principles are always subject to correction in the
light of scientific discovery and better reasoning.
Rawls believes, then, that moral knowledge is possible, though
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it is remarkably unlike knowledge in other spheres. Moral principles are products of human civilization, but they are still subject to
rational criticism. Principles are defective and rationally indefensible if they are grounded in ignorance, based on faulty reasoning,
or could not otherwise be accepted by all parties in a condition of
equality. The principles that could, ideally, be agreed upon are
grounded in full knowledge of the relevant facts to which rational
criteria have been applied in a fair, impartial procedure. These are
the principles that determine the justice of our institutions here
and now.
Having completed a brief sketch of what I take to be a
sympathetic interpretation of Rawls's idea of a contract argument,
I shall conclude with two points that seem worth emphasizing and
a final reference to moral skepticism.
As I read Rawls, the entire weight of the contract argument
rests on the notion of pure procedural justice. The use of a fair
procedure is predicated upon the absence, of an independent
criterion of social justice. This means, I.think, that Rawls must
reject any other possible form of argument for principles of justice.
To support this, Rawls seems to offer only the bare claim that
distributions flowing from or based upon natural or social contingencies alone are arbitrary from a moral point of view. One would
like to see a full explanation and defense of that position.
Even if it can be shown that justice rests on fairness, as Rawls
claims, it is not clear that his conception of a fair procedure is the
only one possible. For one thing, Rawls seems to assume that
principles can be ranked only on the basis of self-interested considerations. But even if, for the sake of a powerful argument, we
exclude considerations such as altruism, which may seem to presuppose moral sentiments, it does not follow that only self-interest
is left. A fuller explanation of the appeal to self-interest would be
desirable. And conceptions of fairness that are different in other
ways may also be possible.
What effect does all this have on moral skepticism? I suggested
at the outset two degrees of skeptical challenges to principles of
justice. The more moderate skeptical claim is simply that there is
no rational basis for ranking alternative conceptions of justice. I
believe that Rawls has done enough to suggest that this view can be
successfully rebutted; there are grounds closely connected with the
very notion of rationality on the basis of which it seems possible to
rank principles of justice. 35
35 It is plausible to suppose that long-range considerations of self-interest are bound up
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It is not so clear, however, that Rawls has answered the more
radical skeptical challenge, which claims that moral principles are,
at bottom, arbitrary. Rawls's contract argument presupposes certain
values that can be classified as "moral," namely, fairness and
impartiality. These are admittedly construed as constraints upon
arguments, deliberation, reasoning, and procedures generally, and
are not applied directly to acts or institutions. Thus, it may seem
that the unargued commitment would be minimal. But to make the
argument work, Rawls must nevertheless make such a commitment, and must provide such vague notions with definite interpretations. He must take a stand on the corresponding values as
opposed to others. The skeptic can demand a justification for
assuming any such constraints. It remains to be seen whether
further argument is possible.
with the notion of rationality, and Rawls's contract argument employs such considerations
exclusively.

